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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Between a Rock and a Hard Place
In November of 1986, five armed men robbed a branch of the
Chase Manhattan Bank in Queens, New York. Edison Purnett was
captured and charged with participating in the crime.' During
arraignment and at several court appearances Purnett acted
strangely, prompting the judge to order a psychological evaluation.3
The court-appointed psychologist concluded that Purnett was compe-
l. United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. Id. at 53 ("[H]e seemed to be visibly agitated for no apparent reason. Indeed he
appeared to 'snap' at defense counsel without any provocation. Certainly the Court was able
to make its own observations of the defendant's unusual behavior .
3. Id.
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tent to stand trial.
At the pretrial "competency hearing," the judge asked Pumett
whether he desired to contest the psychologist's conclusion and
whether he wanted a lawyer. Pumett decided to represent himself.
The judge questioned the defendant's competency, but at the same
time, allowed the defendant to represent himself. Purnett represented
himself at that "competency hearing" by remaining silent." Relying
solely on the psychologist's report, the court found Purnett competent
to stand trial.I After a jury trial, Purnett was convicted of bank rob-
bery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery.' He appealed, contend-
ing that his "waiver of counsel was ineffective because it was made
prior to a valid determination of his competency, and that the deter-
mination of his competency was invalid because it was made while he
was not represented by counsel."' 1
The appellate court in United States v. Purnett clearly stated the
issue as the "perplexing problem that district court judges face when,
while questioning a defendant's competency to stand trial, the accused
asserts the right to conduct his own defense without benefit of coun-
sel.'"" In these situations, the judge faces a constitutional Catch-22.
As the dissent in Purnett pointed out, "[o]n the one hand, if [the trial
judge] forced Purnett to accept appointed counsel, he risked violating
Purnett's right to proceed pro se.... On the other hand, if he did not
force Purnett to accept counsel, he risked the instant challenge [that
defendant was in fact incompetent and unable to waive counsel].' 2
This anomalous predicament reflects the conflict between two
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 52.
8. Id. at 54.
9. Id. at 52.
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id. at 52.
12. Id. at 57 (Timbers, J., dissenting); see also People v. Krom, 458 N.Y.S.2d 693, 698
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("On the one hand, an accused has a constitutional right to defend
himself, founded in our respect for human dignity and the right of an individual to determine
his own destiny, and the denial thereof may require reversal. On the other hand, the dictates
of the concept of fair trial place limitations on that right, so that if improperly honored, it, too,
may require reversal.") (citations omitted); Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Wis. 1980)
("On the one hand, [the trial judge] is required to insure that the defendant's waiver of his
right to counsel is made knowingly and voluntarily, and unless the record adequately supports
such a finding, any resulting conviction is subject to reversal. On the other hand, the trial
judge's conclusion that the defendant does not sufficiently understand his case to make a
knowing waiver, or is not competent to conduct his own defense, necessarily prevents a
defendant from exercising his right of self-representation and may bring reversal on that
ground. Whichever way the trial judge decides, his decision is subject to challenge.").
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underlying legal principles. First, the Supreme Court held in Faretta
v. California 13 that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the "right to
self-representation." 4 This right is so fundamental that any violation
of it is per se reversible error. 5 Conversely, "[i]t is a basic principle of
due process that a defendant cannot be tried for a crime while he is
mentally incompetent."' 16 This principle of due process is also funda-
mental to the criminal justice system. The inherent conflict between
these two basic principles-which arises when a possibly incompetent
defendant seeks to proceed pro se at a competency hearing-is the
subject of this Comment.
There are four possible outcomes when a possibly incompetent
defendant invokes her right to proceed pro se. First, the court can
force the defendant to have counsel during the competency hearing.
If the court then finds the defendant competent, however, she can
argue that the court violated her rights under Faretta, because a com-
petent person has the right to refuse counsel.
Second, the court may force the defendant to have counsel at the
competency hearing, find her incompetent, and then commit her to a
mental hospital for treatment to restore her competency. An argu-
ment arises accordingly that mere incompetence is insufficient to jus-
tify the defendant's loss of liberty without requiring the State to prove
the defendant's guilt in a criminal trial. Some commentators recom-
mend that, under certain circumstances, incompetent or marginally
competent individuals should be permitted to stand trial.1 7
Third, the court may allow the defendant to represent herself at
her competency hearing. If found incompetent, she can then argue
that she may have been found competent had she been forced to have
counsel. Or the defendant can argue that because she was incompe-
tent, the court should not have allowed her to waive her right to
counsel.
Finally, like in United States v. Purnett, the court may allow the
defendant to proceed without counsel at her competency hearing. If
13. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
14. Id. at 820.
15. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
16. Peter R. Silten & Richard Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1053 (1977); see also State v. Furrow, 424 A.2d 694, 698 (Me. 1981) ("The
conviction of a person when he is incompetent to stand trial violates the most basic principles
of due process.").
17. See infra text accompanying notes 143-46. See generally Robert A. Burt & Norval
Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 66-67
(1977) (advocating that when trial competence is not achieved within six months, the State
should dismiss charges or proceed to a trial governed by procedures designed to compensate
defendant's disabilities).
19931
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found competent, the defendant may attack her conviction on the
ground that she should have been found incompetent. The defendant
could argue further that because she was without counsel and incom-
petent, she was wrongly allowed to proceed to trial pro se.
As the examples above show, a defendant may use a double-
edged sword to attack her conviction, regardless of the trial court's
decision. Reversals are frequent, further clogging the overburdened
court system. Judge Engel, concurring in United States v. McDow-
ell,"a described such reversals as a "commonly recurring abuse."' 9
Judge Timbers, dissenting in Purnett, advocated enunciation of a
"bright-line rule" in resolving such dilemmas.2° Without clear guide-
lines, Judge Timbers argued, courts will be "baffled by the same
dilemma countless times in the future."' 2' The majority in United
States v. Dujanovic22 contended that "whether it be by the design or
because of misguidance or naivete on the part of the accused, the trial
court lays an appeal or a collateral attack by either a denial or a
granting of the request. ' 23 In other words, the trial court judge is
damned if she does and damned if she does not.
The majority in Purnett decided that the proper solution to this
constitutional dilemma was to force the defendant to proceed through
a competency hearing with counsel. 2' The dissent critized this
approach, arguing that it "forces a defendant in a criminal case to
accept counsel when the word 'incompetency' is even breathed in
court. ' 25 The Purnett approach begs the question-why should a
defendant not represent himself at his own competency hearing? The
United States Supreme Court has neither ruled on whether the
Faretta right extends to pretrial proceedings, nor specifically
addressed the issue of self-representation at a competency hearing.
This Comment contends that the right to proceed pro se does indeed
extend to one's competency hearing, and for this reason, a method for
resolving this constitutional dilemma is required.
The current lack of a bright-line solution forces trial courts to
individually decide what course to select. Consequently, similarly sit-
uated defendants receive disparate treatment. As the statements of
both Judges Engel and Timbers suggest, this is not an esoteric or
18. 814 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1987).
19. Id. at 252 (Engel, J., concurring).
20. United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1990) (Timbers, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. Id. at 185.
24. 910 F.2d at 56.
25. Id. (Timbers, J., dissenting).
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purely academic issue in criminal competency law, but a difficult issue
with which many courts have wrestled with differing levels of success.
The purpose of this Comment is to delineate and evaluate possible
solutions gleaned from a wide variety of sources. Each has inherent
advantages and disadvantages. After review of the various interests at
stake, this Comment suggests that the most promising option, once a
defendant has requested to proceed pro se, is to require standby (advi-
sory) counsel to be present with the possibly incompetent defendant
during pretrial proceedings until the conclusion of the competency
hearings.
B. "The Pilotless Journey"'26
Before investigating the substantive issues involved, however, it
is necessary to examine the underlying question of why defendants
choose to represent themselves. The reasons are as varied as the
defendants asserting the right. To thoroughly analyze the psychology
of criminal defendants is beyond the scope of this Comment. Still,
several basic reasons surface repeatedly in cases where defendants
decide to "dance a solo, not a pas de deux. '"I"
A common reason is "the desire to evoke the jury's sympathy for
a lone defendant pitted against the Goliath of the State."2 Another
reason is that pro se defendants may believe that they are innocent
and that the criminal justice system is infallible. 29 These idealistic
defendants are therefore surprised when their narrative tirades are cut
off, their evidence ruled inadmissible, and their questioning of wit-
nesses deemed improper.
In many cases, the demand to proceed pro se is triggered by the
simple fact that the attorney fails to keep the defendant adequately
informed. In rejecting his court-appointed attorney in People v. Cran-
dell,30 the defendant stated: "I didn't see him for two months."'"
Similarly, the defendant in State v. Antone32 decided to proceed pro se
because his lawyer never visited him during the four weeks he was in
jail."
26. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d at 186.
27. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 188 (1984).
28. People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 326 (N.Y. 1974); see also State v. Gallant, 595
A.2d 413, 416 (Me. 1991) (defendant described his decision to proceed pro se as a "protest"
and said that he felt "the trial system is stacked against people without money.").
29. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326.
30. 760 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1988).
31. Id. at 431.
32. 724 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
33. Id. at 271.
1993]
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Frequently, the defendant is dissatisfied with the attorney's trial
strategy--or lack thereof. The defendant in Crandell further cited the
public defender's advice to plead guilty prior to making any investiga-
tion of the facts.34 This can be particularly distressing to the defend-
ant when viewed against the backdrop of recent holdings "indorsing
counsel's view when a difference of opinion arises. ' ' 31
Because of the lack of attention afforded to many defendants by
their lawyers, especially to those of borderline mental competency,
such defendants view their attorneys "as an extension of the oppres-
sive system which they distrust. '36 The defendant in People v. Carl,37
diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic by two psychiatrists, believed
that his lawyer was involved in a "plot" against him.38 The fact that
his attorney prepared only briefly, without any consultation from the
defendant, did nothing to bolster the defendant's trust of either coun-
sel or the system.
The reason to proceed pro se is different for every defendant and
may include many of the rationales discussed above. Several key fac-
tors lead to the practical problems that arise in such situations. First,
many defendants have perfectly understandable reasons for proceed-
ing pro se. They may feel qualified to defend themselves. They may
also be the only person willing to put forth a controversial or unusual
defense. Moreover, they may believe it to be a tactical advantage to
prove their intelligence and worth before the judge or jury. Second,
many defendants are in fact in a Catch-22 of their own-they may
trust neither their attorneys nor their ability to proceed pro se. Third,
the decision to proceed pro se may itself be a manifestation of mental
incompetence. Once the defendant decides to proceed pro se, how-
34. Crandell, 760 P.2d at 431.
35. People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 326 (N.Y. 1974); see also Mosby v. State, 457
S.W.2d 836, 840 (Ark. 1970) (a criminal defendant who does not appearpro se has no absolute
right to argue his case to the jury (citing State v. Velanti, 331 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1960)); State v.
Ward, 608 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Kan. 1980) ("A defendant who accepts counsel has no right to
conduct his own trial or dictate the procedural course of his representation by counsel."
(quoting State v. Ames, 563 P.2d 1034, 1044 (Kan. 1977)); Hawkins v. State, 628 S.W.2d 71,
76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ("when a defendant is represented by counsel, he does not have the
right to propound his own questions to witnesses and make jury argument in his own behalf").
The decision to plead guilty, of course, is one for the defendant.
36. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326; see also State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848, 859 (Minn.
1976) ("the defendant's reason for wishing to dispense with defense counsel was his paranoid
distrust of everyone connected with the judicial system"); Commonwealth v. Davis, 573 A.2d
1101, 1102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("appellant stated that with regard to attorneys: 'I don't trust
them' ").
37. 397 N.Y.S.2d 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
38. Id. at 194.
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ever, the constitutional Catch-22 emerges if the court has not yet
determined the issue of the defendant's mental competency.
This Comment analyzes the social and legal issues surrounding
the mental competency dilemma en route to offering practical solu-
tions for its resolution. Part II delves into the background of this area
of the law, discussing the right to proceed pro se, the right to counsel,
the dangers of forced counsel, the requirement of competency to stand
trial, the requirement of competency to proceed pro se, and the past
interaction in the courts between competency and the Constitution.
Part III analyzes the interests at stake in this area for both defendants
and the justice system. These interests include the defendant's right
to free choice and autonomy, the defendant's right to represent him-
self, the system's right to a "just" verdict, judicial economy, and the
negative effects of competency determinations on the defendant and
the justice system. Part IV outlines several practical solutions to the
problem, noting the advantages and drawbacks of each. The Com-
ment concludes that the best approach is to force standby (advisory)
counsel onto the defendant during all pretrial hearings until the con-
clusion of the competency hearing itself, while allowing the defendant
to proceed pro se throughout such proceedings.
II. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COMPETENCY AND SELF-
REPRESENTATION
A. The Right to Proceed Pro Se: Fool for a Client
The Supreme Court announced the criminal defendant's right to
self-representation in Faretta v. California.39 The Court held that an
accused possesses a constitutional right, derived from the Sixth
Amendment, to conduct his own defense provided that he "know-
ingly and intelligently"' 4 forgoes his right to counsel. The Court
noted that the Sixth Amendment provides that the accused, not his
counsel, shall have the right to confront witnesses, be accorded com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and be informed of the nature
of the charges against him.4" Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
pointed out that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely
that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
39. 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). The majority's decision drew vehement objections from the
dissent. Chief Justice Burger, joining with Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, asserted that
"the Court's holding ... can only add to the problems of an already malfunctioning criminal
justice system." Id. at 837.
40. Id. at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)).
41. Id. at 819; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1993]
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personally the right to make his defense."' 42 Moreover, because the
right of self-representation is "basic to our adversary system of crimi-
nal justice," it is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
defendants in state criminal proceedings. 3
The Court further reasoned that "[t]he right to defend is given
directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the
defense fails."" The Court recognized that offering the defendant the
"assistance" of counsel was a far cry from remaking counsel into "an
organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his
right to defend himself personally."45
After mandating the right to proceed pro se, the Court seemed to
take a step back, pointing out that this right had its own particular
"nature" and was therefore limited in scope. Justice Stewart admitted
that "the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair
trial."'46 He added further that "[i]t is undeniable that... defendants
could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own
unskilled efforts."47 However, even more important than a "fair
trial," Justice Stewart noted, is the "inestimable worth of free choice,"
as the Framers of the Constitution were keenly aware.4 Free choice,
the Court believed, weighted the scales of justice toward the defend-
ant's decisionmaking ability, even though it may be "ultimately to his
own detriment. ' 49 The Court, using broad language, held that this
"choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which
42. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
43. Id. at 818.
44. Id. at 819-20.
45. Id. at 820. See also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)
(the accused in a federal criminal prosecution may waive the right to a jury trial, as well as the
right to assistance of counsel if in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the
considered approval of the trial judge).
46. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832-33.
47. Id. at 834; see also James v. State, 730 P.2d 811, 814 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987)
("Except in the most unusual circumstances, a trial in which one side is unrepresented by
counsel is a farcical effort to ascertain guilt."); State v. Kennedy, 586 A.2d 1089, 1091-92 (R.I.
1991) (criminal defendant has an unequivocal right to proceed pro se regardless of whether
defendant could better defend himself with an attorney). But see supra notes 26-38 and
accompanying text (questioning the presumption that a defendant assisted by counsel is better
off than if he had represented himself).
48. 422 U.S. at 833-34.
49. Id. at 834; see also Johnson v. State, 507 A.2d 1134, 1148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)
("We know of no law that requires a defendant be wise in order to waive important rights; it is
only required that he understand the possible consequences."); State v. Sheppard, 310 S.E.2d
173, 188 (W. Va. 1983) ("The test in such cases is not the wisdom of the accused's decision to
represent himself or its effect upon the expeditious administration of justice, but, rather,
whether the defendant is aware of the dangers of self-representation and clearly intends to
waive the rights he relinquishes by electing to proceed pro se.").
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is the lifeblood of the law.' ,,e Because of the constitutional impor-
tance of the right of self-representation, reviewing courts have not
delved into the effect that the denial of the defendant's right to pro-
ceed pro se has upon the verdict. Instead, courts consistently hold
that wrongful denial is per se reversible error.5I
The right to represent oneself in criminal proceedings, however,
is balanced against society's interests in an orderly and efficient judi-
cial process. First, when a defendant proceeds pro se, she surrenders
the benefits associated with the right to counsel. 52 For example, the
pro se defendant forgoes the benefits of a comprehensive cross-exami-
nation conducted by trained counsel.
Second, the court may terminate the right to proceed pro se if the
defendant "deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist miscon-
duct."'5 3 Self-representation does not allow the defendant to destroy
the courtroom's traditional dignity.5 4 Consequently, the trial judge
has latitude in balancing the defendant's right to appear pro se against
the ordered atmosphere required for an effective courtroom.
Third, the pro se defendant is required to follow the procedural
and substantive law that governs the conduct of a certified attorney.55
Where the defendant is unsure of how to preserve an objection, for
example, the trial judge is not required to lecture her on proper advo-
cacy techniques.56 The defendant is responsible for utilizing whatever
scant skills she may possess to mount a successful defense. Specifi-
cally, knowledge of "technical legal matters" is not required to pro-
ceed pro se.57 Clearly, if the right to proceed pro se was based upon
50. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
51. Eric Rieder, Note, The Right to Self-Representation in the Capital Case, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 130, 139-40 (citations omitted); see also Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1973).
52. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
53. Id. at 834-35 n.46.
54. Id.; see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (right of
self-representation "rests on an implied presumption that the court will be able to achieve
reasonable cooperation."); Tait v. State, 362 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (judge has
duty to keep the trial from turning into a "roman circus").
55. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.
56. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 165, 183-84 (1984); see also State v. Bebb, 740 P.2d
829, 834 (Wash. 1987) ("the court is under no duty to inform apro se defendant of the relevant
rules of law").
57. State v. Imus, 679 P.2d 376, 378 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); see also People v. Holcomb,
235 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Mich. 1975) (Appellate court reversed trial court because it denied
defendant's motion to proceed pro se on the grounds that "it would not be in the best interest
of the defendant, would not afford him a proper defense, would not satisfactorily protect his
constitutional rights if he were permitted to represent himself and not have the benefit of a
trained experienced and skilled counsel, [and] that if he were to attempt to defend himself his
demeanor before the jury would probably result in irreparable prejudice against him.");
1993]
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knowledge of legal skills, the right to self-representation would be an
empty one because few defendants possess any actual legal training.58
The defendant is entitled to know of the dangers associated with self-
representation and the waiver of trained counsel,59 but "mere igno-
rance of the law cannot vitiate an effective waiver of counsel."'
Fourth, the defendant who elects to proceed pro se relinquishes
her right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel.6 As the Faretta
court stated, "a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot
thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a
denial of 'effective assistance of counsel.' "62 It would be a strange
system indeed that allowed a defendant to freely select self-representa-
tion and thereby create a safety net for reversal based on her legal
ineptitude.
The nature of the right to proceed pro se, therefore, is limited.
Clearly, the defendant must not abuse the dignity of the courtroom by
engaging in disruptive behavior. Most importantly, the defendant
must follow the same procedural and legal standards as a certified
attorney. Because of the importance of able counsel at the defend-
ant's side, the accused "must 'knowingly and intelligently' forego
those relinquished benefits."' 63 Once the trial court finds the waiver of
counsel is both knowing and voluntary, the court must then permit
the defendant to proceed on his own. 6M The pro se defendant is in the
precarious position of having to act as an adept, skillful attorney,
while at the same time having "a fool for a client."' 65
Coleman v. State, 617 P.2d 243, 245 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) ("Lack of knowledge of the law
is not a valid reason for the trial court to refuse to grant defendant's motion [to proceed pro
se]."). But see State v. Christensen, 698 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (Defendant
was "not advised of the technical aspects of conducting a defense nor the rules regarding
procedures used to preserve error .... Thus, we find [the defendant] did not make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his right to have counsel represent him.") (footnote omitted).
58. See People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327 (N.Y. 1974).
59. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
60. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
61. Fareta, 422 U.S. 834-35 n.46; see also United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251
(6th Cir. 1987) ("The only thing that was 'unfair' about McDowell's trial was that he did not
represent himself very well .... "); United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 188 (9th Cir.
1973) ("one of the penalties of the appellant's self-representation is that he is bound by his own
acts and conduct and held to his record").
62. 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46.
63. Id. at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)).
64. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Lankford, 781 P.2d 197, 202 (Idaho 1989)
("Ultimately, the decision of whether to exercise the right to counsel or proceed pro se is for
the defendant to make. The role of the trial court is simply to ensure that where the defendant
waives the right to counsel he or she does so knowingly and intelligently.").
65. Leonard v. State, 573 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
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B. The Right to Counsel vs. The Right to Proceed Pro Se
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental safe-
guard that is crucial "to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty."66 Justice Black, writing for the majority in Johnson v.
Zerbst,67 penned that "[t]he purpose of the constitutional guaranty of
a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting
from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights. ' 6 The
defendant, without the assistance of trained counsel, has a difficult-if
not impossible-task in attempting to prove her innocence or setting
forth mitigating circumstances. Counsel, through his knowledge of
trial procedure, avenues of defenses, and oft-practiced advocacy skills,
is in most cases a critical element to absolving a defendant from crimi-
nal liability.
Because the right to counsel is "one of the most important ele-
ments of constitutional due process, "69 the trial judge has the "serious
and weighty responsibility"70 of determining whether the accused has
knowingly and intelligently waived this right. Once the trial judge is
satisfied that the defendant understands the importance of the right to
counsel but desires to forego those advantages, the defendant is per-
mitted to proceed pro se. At least one court recognized, however, that
although an accused has both the right to counsel and the right to
represent herself, "it is manifest that any such two constitutional
rights cannot actively co-exist. ' 71 Only the "intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment" 72 of the right to counsel can give rise to the
correlative right of self-representation.7"
The trial court must be keenly aware of the intertwined relation-
ship of these two constitutional rights so as not to deny either right to
a particular defendant-especially when that defendant is of question-
able mental competency. Both rights are crucial to the administration
of justice. Some courts have held, however, that the right to counsel
is preeminent. If the right to counsel is "wrongly denied, the defend-
ant is likely to be more seriously injured than if denied his right to
proceed pro se." '74
The belief that the right to counsel is supreme, however, has the
66. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
67. Id. at 459.
68. Id. at 465.
69. Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Wis. 1980).
70. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 465.
71. See United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
72. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
73. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d at 185.
74. Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 177 (1st Cir. 1987).
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danger of making courts uninhibited in forcing counsel upon unwill-
ing defendants. Courts and commentators have written about the
danger of forced counsel since the formation of the United States.
The most compelling historical example of such an institutional pol-
icy was the English Star Chamber.
C. Forced Counsel: The Star Chamber Experience
In the late 16th and early 17th centuries in England, misde-
meanor defendants were forced to have counsel in order to appear
before the court, known as the Star Chamber. 7 The court would not
accept the defendant's response to the criminal charge until it was
signed by counsel. Unless counsel took responsibility for the answer
and signed it, the court deemed the indictment to be admitted. Fur-
thermore, the court sat without a jury and was permitted to adminis-
ter any penalty but death once the defendant was found guilty. The
purpose of such a system was not justice, but "swiftness and
power."' 76 It allowed professional counsel to steer the defendant in
any direction that he wished, because he was controlled more by the
tribunal than by the client. Counsel's primary loyalty was to the
court. Thus, the court was the central player in the days of the Star
Chamber. The colonies soon rejected this notorious practice and
replaced forced counsel with a system that allowed the accused to
choose whether or not to retain counsel for his defense. 77 The Fram-
ers of the Constitution "conceived of the right to counsel as an 'assist-
ance' for the accused, to be used at his option, in defending
himself."78
Despite attempts to end the problem of forcing counsel upon a
defendant, it continues to affect modem-day defendants, particularly
those deemed "incompetent" to represent themselves. 79 The evil of
forced counsel is that "[iun such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but
a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal
character upon which the [Sixth] Amendment insists."" ° Further-
more, when courts force counsel on unwilling defendants, many view
75. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 51 (1971). The Star
Chamber received its name because the ceiling of the room in which the court heard cases was
covered with stars. It was abolished because its jurisdiction grew enormously, making it much
too onerous for the English people.
76. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 23 (1973).
77. Rieder, supra note 51, at 137.
78. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975).
79. See infra part IV.A.
80. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 (footnote omitted); see also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155,
161 (1957) ("The constitutional right [to representation], of course, does not justify forcing
counsel upon an accused who wants none.").
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it as another example of the omnipotent state taking away these
defendants' autonomy and freedom. "To force a lawyer on a defend-
ant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him."81
When the accused is uncooperative, the possible advantage of having
an attorney can only be realized to a limited extent.82 When this lim-
ited advantage, if any, of having unwanted counsel is balanced against
the deeply rooted and long-standing belief that forcing counsel upon
an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic, fundamental rights,8 3
it is clear that only in unusual circumstances should a court force an
accused to accept counsel.8 4
D. Pro Se Representation and the Competency Requirement
1. THE REQUIREMENT OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Before analyzing the requirements for competency that must be
satisfied before a court allows a particular defendant to proceed pro se,
it is necessary to briefly review the basic competency level required to
stand trial.
It is a fundamental principle, derived from the traditional rule
against trials in absentia, that the conviction of an accused while she
is mentally incompetent violates the right to due process of law. 5 A
defendant present in body, but not in mind, has no real chance to
present her defense-even with the aid of counsel-against the
resources and preparation of the State. 6
In Dusky v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court created a two-
part test to determine the competency of a defendant to stand trial.
The test is: (1) "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing;" and (2) "whether [the defendant] has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against her."'8' This inquiry
places emphasis on the defendant's mental capacity to assist his attor-
ney and to understand the nature of the proceedings and the charges
81. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
82. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
83. Id. at 817.
84. Part IV.A addresses whether or not possible mental incompetency should be one of
those "unusual circumstances."
85. Silten & Tullis, supra note 16, at 1053.
86. Id.; see also Clark D. Stith, Project, Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-90, 79 GEO. L.J. 743, 901 (1991) (the
conviction of an incompetent defendant also deprives him of his constitutional right to a fair
trial).
87. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
88. Id. at 402.
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against her. 9 The issue of competency focuses on the accused's
mental condition during trial-not at the time the criminal act tran-
spired.9 The bottom line is that the accused must be sufficiently com-
petent to "follow the proceedings, evaluate the evidence, and
understand the significance of what is transpiring in the
courtroom." 91
2. LEVELS OF INCOMPETENCY: THE SPECTRUM REALITY
The test enunciated in Dusky does not, however, attempt to dis-
cover whether the defendant is "mentally ill." Courts have found
mentally ill defendants competent to stand trial when the individual's
mental state satisfied Dusky's two-pronged test.92 The accepted real-
ity today is that a particular defendant's mental condition may fall at
any point along a broad spectrum. This makes it particularly difficult
for legislatures or courts to draw a clear line between competency and
incompetency of a defendant to stand trial, to represent oneself, or to
plead guilty. With the modem recognition of functional disorders
and the advances in psychiatric medicine, "the view that there is a
clear, qualitative division between the sane and the mentally ill has
largely been abandoned in favor of the quantitative view, that there is
no such clear line between the two; there is rather an unbroken con-
tinuum from normal to abnormal." 93
This spectrum of mental illness has a specific effect on a trial
court's determination of whether an individual defendant is compe-
89. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 388 (1966) (Harland, J., dissenting).
90. Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1974); Pate, 383 U.S. at 378.
91. Silten & Tullis, supra note 16, at 1060.
92. See Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Although there was testimony
that Shaw abused drugs and alcohol, had been emotionally disturbed, and perhaps had latent
schizophrenia, the psychiatrist that he called at trial explained in the post-conviction hearing
that Shaw was not psychotic. This psychiatrist and the State's psychiatrist testified that Shaw
was competent to participate in the plea and sentencing proceedings, to assist his attorney in
his defense, and in general to stand trial."); Clyburn v. United States, 381 A.2d 260, 263 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (being a "troubled man" does not mean that the defendant lacks the competency to
stand trial); Cowan v. State, 579 So. 2d 13, 15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ("the fact that a
defendant is mentally ill does not necessarily mean that he is legally incompetent to stand
trial") (quoting 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 550 (1989)); State v. Galbraith, 723 S.W.2d 55, 65
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("suspicion or actual presence of some degree of mental illness or need for
psychiatric treatment does not equate with incompetency to stand trial"); State v. Smith, 749
P.2d 202, 205 (Wash. Ct. App.) ("Even a criminal defendant who is mentally ill may waive his
right to counsel if the [Dusky] standards are met."); see also Chichakly v. United States, 926
F.2d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 1991) (defendant was taking large amounts of prescription medication
for depression and insomnia, but was found competent to plead guilty).
93. Henry Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1960); see
also Ronald Roesch & Stephen L. Golding, Who is Competent to Stand Trial, TRIAL, Sept.
1985, at 40, 42.
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tent to stand trial. A court, in applying the Dusky test, cannot simply
find that a defendant has hallucinations, delusions, or other abnormal-
ities.94 Instead, it must show that these problems will affect the
defendant's chances of success before the court.95 Once this can be
established, it must declare the defendant "incompetent" and suspend
the proceedings against her.96 The state should then give the defend-
ant mental health treatment to restore her competency, at which time
the proceedings can continue.97
3. COMPETENCY HEARINGS
The United States Supreme Court, in Pate v. Robinson,98 articu-
lated the standard for determining whether the trial judge must hold a
hearing to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. The
Court stated that, "[w]here the evidence raises a 'bona fide doubt' as
to a defendant's competence to stand trial, the judge on his own
motion" 99 must hold a hearing to ascertain whether the defendant has
sufficient competency to stand trial under the Dusky test.lI° The evi-
dence may be discovered either by the judge's own observation or the
indication of counsel. 101
If the judge feels the evidence raises a "bona fide doubt," the
usual response is to order a psychiatric examination of the defend-
ant. 102 Typically, the court will then hold a hearing in which each
party with information concerning the defendant's mental condition
appears before the court to testify. 103 The court must then determine
94. Roesch & Golding, supra note 93, at 42.
95. Id.
96. Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits,
and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 243 (1987).
97. Id. at 243-44.
98. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
99. Id. at 385. As for the "bona fide doubt" standard necessary to hold a competency
hearing, one court held that "the right to a competency hearing is not absolute. A competency
hearing is required . . .only when the trial court has 'reasonable grounds' for believing the
defendant may not be competent to stand trial." Adams v. State, 509 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ind.
1987) (citations omitted).
100. Silten & Tullis, supra note 16, at 1054-55; see also Johnson v. State, 507 A.2d 1134,
1140 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) ("[T]he trial court's duty to determine the competency of an
accused to stand trial is triggered in one of three ways: (1) upon an allegation by the accused
himself that he is incompetent; (2) upon an allegation by defense counsel that the accused is
incompetent; or (3) upon the court's sua sponte decision that the accused appears to be
incompetent.").
101. Silten & Tullis, supra note 16, at 1055. The Seventh Circuit held, in a similar vein, that
the trial judge is "entitled to rely upon representations from an attorney that his client is
competent ...." Chichakly v. United States, 926 F.2d 624, 634 (7th Cir. 1991).
102. Silten & Tullis, supra note 16, at 1055.
103. Id.; see also Nail v. State, 465 P.2d 957, 959 (Kan. 1970) (psychiatrist not required to
examine the defendant for a finding of competency or incompetency to be upheld).
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whether or not the defendant is fit to stand trial. The court will find
the defendant competent to stand trial unless a preponderance of the
evidence introduced at the hearing shows that she is mentally
incompetent. 1'
E. Competency to Stand Trial vs. Competency to Proceed Pro Se
There is a vast difference of opinion as to whether competency to
waive counsel and conduct a defense is different from competency to
stand trial. Two lines of thought pervade this issue: one argues that
the level of competency required to proceed pro se is higher than the
level of competency required to stand trial, while the other vehe-
mently attacks any such distinction.
Traditionally, most courts have come down on the side that "the
standard of competence for making the decision to represent oneself is
vaguely higher than the standard for competence to stand trial."1 °5
The typical definition for competency to waive counsel and proceed
pro se is a two-part determination, which includes: "(1) competency
to stand trial and (2) a knowing and intelligent waiver with 'eyes
open', which includes an awareness of the dangers and disadvantages
of the decision."' 6 After a trial court finds the defendant competent
to stand trial through the application of the Dusky test, most courts
attempt to make some meaningful use of the amorphous standard
quoted above by informing the defendant of the dangers and disad-
vantages of self-representation. After completing this on the record,
the court will then usually try to satisfy itself that the defendant
understands what she has been told, and that she is entering into this
decision "knowingly and intelligently"'' 07 and with "eyes open. '108
104. Silten & Tullis, supra note 16, at 1055-56.
105. Commonwealth v. Wertheimer, 472 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Mass. App. Ct.) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States ex reL Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir.
1975)); see also People v. Burnett, 234 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (the competence
required to stand trial is quite different than that needed to participate without counsel);
People v. Kessler, 447 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ("The competence to waive counsel
is generally considered to require a stricter scrutiny than the standard to stand trial or to
plead."); Smith v. State, 524 A.2d 117, 120 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (competency to stand
trial not the same standard as competency to waive counsel and proceed pro se). But see
Medina v. California, 113 S. Ct. 19 (1992) (statute requiring that party asserting incompetency
of defendant to stand trial had burden of proving status did not violate procedural due process
rights of defendant).
106. State v. Hahn, 726 P.2d 25, 30 (Wash. 1986).
107. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
108. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). The trial judge
must be sure to "open[ ] the defendant's eyes" by informing the defendant of the many
disadvantages of representing himself. If the judge fails in this respect, it is reversible error.
See People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 95-96 (Colo. 1989) (judge's lack of explanation of the
dangers of proceeding pro se was reversible error); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1293
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Those two phrases do not have any talismanic qualities, however. It
is up to the individual judge to determine the difference between that
standard and the traditional standard for competency to stand trial.
The courts opting to utilize this "vaguely higher" standard for
waiver of counsel have done so because, "[i]n this situation, it is clear
that the defendant must have greater powers of comprehension, judg-
ment, and reason than would be necessary to stand trial with the aid
of an attorney."'" These courts rely on the per curiam opinion issued
by the Supreme Court in Westbrook v. Arizona.'10 The Court vacated
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona, which affirmed the
conviction of a defendant who received a hearing to determine his
competence to stand trial but not one concerning the issue of his com-
petence to waive counsel and conduct his own defense.' " The com-
mon interpretation is that because the Court found error in the lower
court's failure to make a distinct inquiry into competence to waive
counsel, the waiver standard must be somewhat higher than the stan-
dard of competency to merely stand trial.
Other courts, however, interpret Westbrook as standing for a
completely different proposition: that the competency standards are
not different. The Supreme Court of Washington, sitting en banc in
State v. Hahn,"2 called the "vaguely higher" standard a "mis-
characterization of Westbrook v. Arizona."'"13 The court noted that
the Westbrook court did not hold that the trial judge had to make an
"enhanced probe""I 4 into the defendant's competency to proceed pro
se, but merely that the trial judge must make a "separate inquiry"'"15
regarding this issue of competency. The court pointed out that as
long as the defendant is competent to stand trial and makes the deci-
sion to proceed pro se "knowingly and intelligently," she may proceed
without any further competency review." 16
Courts from several other states have also agreed with this logic.
The Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Reason,1 7 for exam-
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (judge must advise the defendant of the "nature, extent, and importance"
of the right to counsel and the consequences of waiving this right before allowing the
defendant to proceed pro se).
109. Silten & Tullis, supra note 16, at 1068; see also Ford v. State, 515 So. 2d 34, 41 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1986) ("greater care must be taken in allowing a person to waive his right to an
attorney than it does in finding him competent to stand trial").
110. 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
Ill. Id.
112. State v. Hahn, 726 P.2d 25 (Wash. 1986).
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 334 N.E.2d 572, 574 (N.Y. 1975).
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pie, held that the standard of competency to stand trial is exactly the
same as the standard of competency to waive counsel and proceed pro
se. The court stated that, in order to permit a defendant to proceed
pro se, the law "does not require a further psychiatric examination
and yet another formal hearing to determine mental competency to
defend pro se, whatever that may mean."' 18
Federal courts have also occasionally held the standard to be
equal. In United States v. Hafen,' 9 the First Circuit wrote that the
"[a]ppellant does not dispute that he was competent to stand trial;
from this fact the trial court was entitled to infer that he was also
competent to waive his right to counsel."'' 20  Other federal courts,
however, have held that an accused suffering from paranoid delusions
was competent to stand trial, but incompetent to waive the right to
counsel and represent herself.' 2 ' The lack of uniformity at both the
federal and state level indicates the widespread difficulty that courts
have with determining whether the standard for competency to pro-
ceed pro se is any different than the standard for competency to stand
trial. Moreover, if the standard for proceeding pro se is higher, it is
questionable whether the courts can apply a workable standard of
competency.
III. THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
STATE: THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA
A. In General: A Search for Balance
When a criminal defendant attempts to invoke her right to pro-
ceed pro se, the scales of justice are subject to an interplay of constitu-
tional, social, and ethical weights and measures. The individual and
the State, both involved in a complex struggle for survival, each have
a multitude of conflicting interests. Furthermore, when a defendant
may be mentally incompetent to handle her own defense, the stakes
for both the State and the defendant run even higher.
118. Id. at 574; see also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 731-32 n.ll (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
("We prefer the term 'knowingly' to 'competently,' because the latter term may imply a
separate psychiatric assessment of competence, beyond that used to determine competence to
stand trial, that.., we do not believe is necessary to invoke the right of self-representation.").
But cf. State v. Contreras, 542 P.2d 17, 19 (Ariz. 1975) (competence to plead guilty is the same
as competence to stand trial); People v. Siler, 506 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("[O]ur
determination that defendant was competent to proceed pro se necessarily includes a
determination that defendant was also fit to stand trial").
119. 726 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 25; see also United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Odom, 423 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1970).
121. Government of V.I. v. Niles, 295 F. Supp. 266 (D.V.I. 1969).
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Whose interest should control? Which interest, in a democratic
system of government, should be granted more deference? The solu-
tions to this Catch-22, as delineated in Part IV, depend on the hierar-
chy of values that a particular court espouses. Both viewpoints offer
logical contentions, but it may be that only by combining particular
elements of each into a unified doctrine can a workable solution be
formulated.
B. The Individual's Interest
Justice Richardson, concurring and dissenting in People v.
Chadd, 22 laid out the crux of the argument in favor of allowing the
individual to control her own destiny. Citing Faretta, he noted, "
'The right to defend is personal.' These words hold the key to the
issue before us."'1 23 This personal right-to refuse the services of an
attorney no matter how unwise the decision may be-is "deeply
ingrained' in our common law and legal tradition. The initial
weight of the scales, therefore, must tip toward recognizing the inher-
ent freedom given to defendants in our criminal justice system.
The next most often cited rationale for allowing the defendant to
proceed pro se is "to affirm the accused's individual dignity and auton-
omy.' 25 Faretta's original rationale was similar, based on the
"respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."' 26 The
Supreme Court of Alaska noted that it is "mindful that ours is a soci-
ety valuing the autonomy of the individual and his freedom of
choice."' 127 This notion of choice-whether described in terms of
respect, dignity, or autonomy-has always been foremost in the eyes
of the court. The right to proceed pro se, then, is not just a right that
can be invoked only with approval of the state, but "one of the most
cherished ideals of our culture: the right of an individual to deter-
mine his own destiny." 128
Although such idealism is more dicta than a practical rule of law,
it is further supported by the realistic-but rare-possibility that the
defendant may be her own best representative. By allowing the
defendant to proceed pro se, the defendant is permitted to present to
the court "what may, at least occasionally, be the accused's best possi-
122. 621 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1981).
123. Id. at 849 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 832, 834 (1975)).
124. People v. Carl, 397 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
125. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
126. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
127. McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91 (Alaska 1974).
128. People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. 1974).
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ble defense."' 29 Defense counsel, if utilized, has the job of choosing
the theory upon which to proceed at trial. A defendant who wishes to
use a novel or unusual approach may quickly find her ideas silenced
by her own counsel, unless she is the sole manager of her own defense.
"Under some circumstances, he may indeed be the only person who
will forcefully advance arguments in an unpopular cause."1 30 The pro
se defendant, then, has the unique ability to steer her own defense
down whatever path she chooses, unfettered by the chains of counsel's
approval.
The defendant's interest, however, does not extend only to those
activities that fulfill his desire to be a self-determining entity. The
definition of "interest" must be so broad as to include self-protection.
Even a child knows that the right to touch the stove comes concur-
rently with the right to get burned. One of the obvious end results of
a failure to successfully defend pro se is the "complete loss of liberty
or life." 13 Courts have long recognized that professional counsel pro-
vides the best protection for the defendant's freedom interests: "It is
only through an appreciation for and an ability to use these technical
rules, gleaned from three years of specialized legal education and in
many instances, years of criminal defense experience, that one is
assured of a proper legal defense." '132 Thus, the defendant has an
interest in remaining out of prison and out of the electric chair, even if
she believes that her primary interest lies elsewhere.
The most important interest that a defendant has at stake, it has
been argued, is to avoid the serious burdens imposed on defendants by
the competency determination process. 133 First, defendants found
incompetent to stand trial often find themselves caught in a vicious
circle of psychotropic drugs, clinical evaluations, and courtroom
hearings. 134 Serious counseling is rarely utilized, resulting in a situa-
tion in which the defendant is continually being found incompetent,
and perpetually sent back to the mental facility for further "treat-
ment."'135 One result is that the defendant, confined for as much as
129. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177.
130. McCracken, 518 P.2d at 91.
131. State v. Christensen, 698 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). Of course, the end
result of an unsuccessful defense with counsel is also the loss of life or liberty. Whether the
individual stands a better chance with or without counsel depends on whether one is asking the
defendant or the attorney. The bottom line is that "[a]n unwanted counsel 'represents' the
defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction." State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d
301, 354 (La. 1976).
132. Christensen, 698 P.2d at 1072.
133. See generally Winick, supra note 96.
134. Id. at 248.
135. Id. at 248-49. "One recent study found that incompetent defendants were hospitalized
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thirty to sixty days (and in some cases, for a matter of several months)
for a routine evaluation-without the applicable concept of "bail"-is
painfully separated from her family and community. 136 This also may
result in the loss of employment, further exacerbating problems that
may have initially caused her confinement.1 37
Second, the period of hospitalization can make the collection of
evidence and the questioning of witnesses difficult if not impossible. 138
This hampering of trial preparation prejudices the defendant from
providing a substantiated account of the facts. The state's self-
appointed position as protector thus destroys the defendant's key
interest-proving innocence.
Finally, the defendant has an interest in avoiding "unwarranted
confinement." '39 The defendant has the undeniable right to contest
all charges and to have their substantive basis determined by a court
of law.'" The incompetent defendant may be unable to effectively
battle the state's legal arsenal, but such inability is the same whether
the defendant is confined through civil or criminal actions. 41 "Of the
two, the criminal trial is more likely to afford the defendant protec-
tion against unwarranted confinement."' 42 Denied the ability to fight
what may be false charges, the defendant loses the basic presumption
of innocence until proven guilty. Such a presumption is of questiona-
ble value to an individual strapped to a hospital bed.
Although some commentators admit that "[t]he trial of an
incompetent may, indeed, be unfair," '143 they remain convinced that it
is actually more unfair to withhold a criminal trial.' 44 "Withholding
trial often results in an endless prolongation of the incompetent
defendant's accused status, and his virtually automatic civil commit-
ment."'145 The cruel irony is that this system is designed to insure that
incompetent defendants are treated fairly. 146
Any proposed solution must take into account all of the defend-
ant's foregoing interests. As the Supreme Court cautioned in Adams
for an average period of two or three years, and that many defendants were held for
considerably longer periods." Id. at 249.
136. Id. at 256-57.
137. Id. at 257.
138. Id.
139. Burt & Morris, supra note 17, at 73.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 75.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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v. United States ex rel. McCann, 47 "[w]hen the administration of the
criminal law.., is hedged about as it is by the Constitutional safe-
guards for the protection of an accused, to deny him in the exercise of
his free choice the right to dispense with some of these safeguards...
is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution." '48
C. The State's Interest
The defendant's stake in the proceedings against her, while
important to her on a personal level, stands in stark contrast to the
interests possessed by the state. Respect for the defendant's right to
self-representation must "be tempered by concern"'' 49 for the many
other rights and interests involved. The first of these societal interests
that should be analyzed when formulating a solution is the "interest
of society ...that our criminal justice system must determine the
truth or falsity of the charges in a manner consistent with fundamen-
tal fairness."'5 0 The basic principle of the justice system is to deter-
mine whether the defendant committed the crime as charged within
the confines of procedural and substantive due process. A system that
allows a possibly incompetent defendant to fight unaided against the
powerful state, however, is fundamentally unfair. 5' "No trial can be
fair that leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by coun-
sel, and who by reason of his mental condition stands helpless and
alone before the court. 1 52 Without the "guiding hand of counsel,"
even the individual with a perfect defense'5 3 may end up in a prison
cell.
Clearly, our society views the imprisonment of an innocent per-
son as a grave injustice, and "[n]either the state, nor the defendant, is
in any sense served when a wrongful conviction is easily obtained as a
result of an incompetent defendant's attempt to defend himself."' 54
Society, therefore, also has an interest in forcing the State to prove
each element of the criminal charge, thereby keeping innocent persons
from erroneous imprisonment. In most cases, this protection comes
from skilled counsel, and not the defendant acting on her own.'55
147. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
148. Id. at 280.
149. State v. Imus, 679 P.2d 376, 387 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (Ringold, J., dissenting).
150. People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. 1974).
151. Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that the right to
proceed pro se "is limited and a court may appoint counsel over an accused's objection in order
to protect the public interest in the fairness and integrity of the proceedings").
152. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
153. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
154. Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Wis. 1980).
155. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 (1975).
[Vol. 47:883
PRO SE PROCEEDINGS
The competence requirement is especially important in protect-
ing the defendant because it "ensures that each defendant is a con-
scious, rational participant at trial; otherwise a criminal trial 'loses its
character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his
community and becomes an invective against an insensible
object.' "56 No sane system wields its power against mere objects,
especially ones with human faces. 57
The second major societal interest involved is the orderly admin-
istration of justice. Allowing the defendant to "commit judicial sui-
cide" ' 58 before the court is one thing, but to allow her to waste
precious judicial resources is quite another. As one judge stated:
Society's interest in the integrity of the truth-determining process
and the need to have the trial proceed in an orderly fashion require
that there be some qualification on the right. This concern is based
upon the principle that only through an "orderly exposition of the
issues" can society be adequately assured that the truth has been
determined. '59
The system's interest, then, extends not only to conserving
resources, but also to insuring that its first major interest-protecting
the fairness and integrity of its proceedings--can be carried out in an
orderly manner. Without order, the system effectively breaks down,
causing the courts to become three-ring circuses.'60 This is one of the
risks inherent in allowing a defendant, unskilled in the trial process,
to proceed pro se: that her lack of legal knowledge will cause the
system to lose its efficiency and fact finding abilities, bringing it down
to a level that it constantly battles to rise above.
Furthermore, the "procedural rules in this area must ... prevent
the manipulative defendant from fashioning a record which seems to
reflect an unconstitutional denial of the path not chosen.'' The
156. Note, Competence to Plead Guilty and to Stand Trial: A New Standard When a
Criminal Defendant Waives Counsel, 68 VA. L. REV. 1139, 1141-42 (1982).
157. Even when courts do not consider criminal defendants "objects," they usually consider
these individuals "frail," thus requiring protective measures against unfair treatment.
"Judicial experience with human frailties has long since taught the necessities of safeguarding
the accused in criminal proceedings." United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir.
1973).
158. Burks v. State, 748 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Coats, J., dissenting).
159. People v. Reason, 334 N.E.2d 572, 576 (N.Y. 1975) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
160. See Russell v. State, 383 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ind. 1978) ("Finally, there is the state's
interest in preserving the orderly processes of criminal justice and courtroom decorum."). But
see Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("[T]hat its exercise may
cause some inconvenience or even disruption in the trial proceedings, so long as it is not a
calculated obstruction, cannot deprive the accused of the right [to proceed pro se], once
asserted.").
161. Russell, 383 N.E.2d at 312.
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criminal justice system has the responsibility to protect itself against
such abusive practices, and the procedures used must be sufficient to
prevent the precise Catch-22 situation described in this Comment.
The solution must include a method for balancing the defendant's
right to counsel and right to self-representation to avoid the defend-
ant's use of this "heads I win, tails you lose" 162 proposition.
This review of the major interests of both the defendant and the
state suggests that "[t]here is no necessary hierarchy among these
interests, and they are not necessarily antithetical." 163 The secret to
formulating a workable solution for self-representation during one's
competency hearing is to protect as many interests as feasible, while
compromising obviously incongruous positions for the ultimate good
of the individual defendant and society as a whole.
IV. SOLUTIONS: SOLVING THE PUZZLE
A. Forcing Counsel on the Defendant
All of these background issues point to one overriding truth:
that the competency question, when it interacts with the right of self-
representation, creates a "trap" of constitutional proportions that
challenges both courts and scholars. The question presented is how to
devise a solution to the problem of defendants who assert their right
to proceed pro se before their competence has been determined that
upholds the benefits and importance of the right to self-representa-
tion, while at the same time preserving the state's interest in protect-
ing the defendant and maintaining the dignity of its own system.
The Purnett solution is to force counsel onto the defendant. 164
This system forces the defendant to proceed at the competency hear-
ing (and all pre-competency hearings once a doubt as to the defend-
ant's competency is raised) with defense counsel at the helm. Several
courts go even further and suggest that a competency hearing should
be held and counsel forced onto the defendant anytime a defendant
desires to proceed pro se.165
The advantages to this solution are three-fold. First, if one
assumes that the Faretta right to self-representation does not include
pretrial proceedings, then this solution is easily integrated into the
present legal system. "In Faretta, our high court declined to make the
right of a defendant to represent himself in proper person absolute
162. State v. Imus, 679 P.2d 376, 382 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting People v. Sharp, 499
P.2d 489 (Cal. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973)).
163. Russell, 383 N.E.2d at 312.
164. United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1990).
165. See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 573 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
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and assertable at any stage of the trial proceeding." 166 Second, this
solution allows the court to run smoothly and efficiently by utilizing
professional counsel at least through the competency hearing, thereby
saving time and money. Third, this method is not as radical a depar-
ture from constitutional standards as appears at first glance. Purnett
noted that "the unwanted participation of appointed counsel during
pretrial hearings and conferences is much less intrusive on the right to
self-representation than such participation at trial."' 16 7 Since forcing
counsel on an unwilling defendant prior to trial is only a minor intru-
sion, the constitutional right of self-representation is not violated.
The primary disadvantage of forcing counsel onto an unwilling
defendant, even if only for pretrial hearings, is that it directly subverts
the individual's interests of autonomy, dignity, freedom of choice-
those same interests that Faretta referred to as "the lifeblood of the
law."'16 1 Moreover, as one court has noted, "[u]nwanted counsel 'rep-
resents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal
fiction."' 169 Where counsel is forced on the defendant prior to the con-
clusion of the competency hearing, there still exists, for all practical
purposes, an "unrepresented" defendant standing before the court.
B. Deferring the Competency Hearing
The second possible solution is to defer the competency hearing
until after the trial. This proposal would ignore competency as a bar-
rier to self-representation unless the defendant is found guilty. Once
the defendant is found guilty, the fact-finder would evaluate the
defendant's competency. One advantage to this solution is that it
allows the defendant to prove her innocence, as well as test the State's
evidence, in order to put the State "to its burdens." This is impossible
when the defendant is committed to a mental treatment facility for an
indefinite period of time.' 70 The second advantage is that this gives
the defendant his dignity and autonomy by initially presuming com-
petence and allowing her to conduct her own defense.' 7'
There are, however, disadvantages to such a system. First, this
system could waste valuable resources because the conviction might
be overturned after completion of the entire process. Second this sys-
tem would increase the probability that the judge or jury would
impermissibly consider the defendant's courtroom conduct in passing
166. State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d 301, 353 (La. 1975).
167. 910 F.2d at 56.
168. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
169. Nix, 327 So. 2d at 354.
170. Winick, supra note 96, at 257.
171. The Supreme Court suggested this solution in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1974).
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on her competency. The Ninth Circuit, in Cooley v. United States,
held that "the manner in which the defendant conducts his defense
cannot conclusively establish his state of mind at the time" he opted
for self-representation. 172 It would seem almost impossible to instruct
the fact-finders to ignore the defendant's conduct that they personally
witnessed for weeks or months, and contain their investigation to
what transpired before the trial.
C. Allowing Waiver of Incompetency Status
The third alternative is to allow the defendant to waive her
incompetency status. This system would allow a possibly incompe-
tent defendant to waive her incompetence status and proceed pro se.
The trial judge would need to exercise more control to make sure the
proceedings run smoothly, and higher courts could not reverse solely
on the basis that the defendant was incompetent. Some expert com-
mentators favor applying this solution to the vast range of compe-
tency problems that arise, not merely to this one situation alone.173
One advantage of allowing a defendant to waive her incompetency
status is that this avoids both the costs and the impact of competency
evaluations. Rather than helping the defendant, such evaluations can
cause huge burdens to the defendant. 174
The second advantage is that this alternative may, in fact,
enhance our system's goal of administering justice. As one commenta-
tor notes, "the appearance of justice is furthered by respecting the
wishes of defendants . . . to face their charges rather than denying
them that right out of a false paternalism."' 17 The bottom line here is
that incompetent defendants already may waive valuable rights-for
example, the right to remain silent-as explained by the Supreme
Court in Colorado v. Connelly.176
The biggest disadvantage to this approach is that the view that
the system has a duty to protect incompetent defendants is much too
ingrained in our present system to make this an acceptable solution.
Clearly, there are situations where treatment and evaluations play a
positive role in the defendant's life. 177 Before moving toward such an
aggressive solution, courts should attempt to find a simpler and more
integratable proposition. 178
172. 501 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1974).
173. See generally Winick, supra note 96, at 259-64.
174. See supra notes 133-146 and accompanying text.
175. Winick, supra note 96, at 264.
176. 479 U.S. 157, 164-54 (1986).
177. See generally Winick, supra note 96, at 258-59.
178. Legal scholarship must offer realistic, practical alternatives to the status quo. "Pie in
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D. Standby Counsel: The Best Alternative
The best alternative, after weighing the interests of the defendant
versus the interests of the system, and viewing the entire situation in
light of historical and judicial precedents, is to allow the defendant to
proceed pro se before her competency hearing with mandatory
standby counsel at her side. In other words, if a bona fide doubt exists
as to defendant's competency (or even possibly whenever a defendant
wanted to proceed pro se), then the court should appoint advisory
counsel.
The chief advantage to this solution is that it enables the defend-
ant to maintain control of her own defense, keep a sense of dignity
and autonomy, and exercise her freedom of choice (the original aims
of Faretta),'19 while at the same time relieving "the judge of the need
to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist
the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way
of the defendant's achievement of his own clearly indicated goals."'' 0
One of the major problems with pro se representation is that it
hurts the "orderly administration of a criminal trial."'' Standby
counsel basically alleviates this problem by providing the defendant
with professional counsel to answer procedural questions and make
suggestions, while allowing the defendant to control the strategy and
direction of her own defense." 2
This solution does have several inherent difficulties. With care-
fully drawn boundaries, however, they do not present insurmountable
obstacles. First, there is the very real possibility that standby counsel
will overstep her role as "advisory" counsel and attempt to direct the
movement of the case. The defendant's right to proceed pro se must
be carefully guarded because, "[i]f standby counsel's participation
over the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or
substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to
control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defend-
the sky" changes, which attempt to radically alter hundreds of years of jurisprudence with a
single pen stroke, do more to badger the courts than to assist them in solving their (our)
problems.
179. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
180. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984).
181. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 1973).
182. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183 ("Faretta rights are also not infringed when standby
counsel assists the pro se defendant in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles
to the completion of some specific task, such as introducing evidence or objecting to testimony,
that the defendant has clearly shown he wishes to complete. Nor are they infringed when
counsel merely helps to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom
protocol and procedure. In neither case is there any significant interference with the
defendant's actual control over the presentation of his defense.").
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ant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded."' 113
Second, no affirmative right exists under present law to force an
appointment of advisory counsel for an indigent defendant.184 A
court may, however, appoint standby counsel to assist the pro se
defendant if it so desires.'8 5 In fact, the Faretta court noted that the
trial court may, "even over objection by the accused[,] appoint a
'standby counsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused requests
help."' 86 In a positive sense, therefore, the judicial precedent already
exists to allow courts to force standby counsel onto the defendant, as
long as counsel's performance remains within the boundaries of rea-
sonable assistance. This solution would only require judicial expan-
sion from the present concept of permitting the trial court to appoint
standby counsel to forcing standby counsel upon a pro se defendant
when her competency is in question.8 7
Third, courts have held that "appointment of standby counsel is
not a substitute for appointed counsel where a person is incapable of
making a constitutional waiver of counsel."'' 88 It can be argued, how-
ever, that such courts were referring to standby counsel at trial, not
merely at pre-competency hearing proceedings as advocated here.
Clearly, in order for apointment of standby counsel to be an effective
183. Id. at 178.
184. People v. Crandell, 760 P.2d 423, 439 (Cal. 1988) ("the right to the assistance of
counsel, guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, has never been held to include a
right to the appointment of advisory counsel to assist a defendant who voluntarily and
knowingly elects self-representation"); see also McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 951-52; Ford v. State,
515 So. 2d 34, 43 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (standby counsel not required to be appointed when
client opts to represent himself); In re Haskins, 551 A.2d 65, 66 (Del. 1988) (no right to
"hybrid representation"); State v. Williams, 352 S.E.2d 428 (N.C. 1987) (no right to appear
both in propia persona and by counsel).
185. State v. Antone, 724 S.W.2d 267, 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
186. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975); see also Ball v. State, 337 So. 2d
31, 38 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (trial court, after granting defendant's motion to proceed pro se,
required standby counsel to sit with the defendant throughout the proceedings); Scarbrough v.
State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("participation of standby counsel does not
infringe upon Faretta's guarantee of self-representation, and may even be imposed upon the
accused consistently with the Sixth Amendment"); State v. Watkins, 606 P.2d 1237, 1239
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) ("Standby counsel may be appointed even over objection by the
accused to aid the accused if and when he or she requests help, and to be available to represent
the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation becomes
necessary.").
187. Or, as previously noted, this could be expanded so as to force any defendant who
wishes to proceed pro se before or during his own competency hearing to appear only with
standby counsel.
188. Burks v. State, 749 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); see also McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1989). But cf State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108, 112-13 (Wash. Ct. App.
1983) (hybrid representation--defendant as co-counsel with his attorney-does not amount to
pro se representation and no waiver of the right to counsel is involved).
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solution, appellate courts must find that it affords sufficient due pro-
cess to avoid reversals on that basis.
The overriding advantage to this solution is that it effectively bal-
ances the concerns of the state-accuracy, efficiency, and procedural
control-with the original ideals of Faretta. The Supreme Court of
Alaska in McCracken v. State, 89 although discussing a situation in
which the defendant was "competent," said that "where the court is
not completely satisfied that the defendant is capable of pro se repre-
sentation, [the court] may insist that the prisoner accept consultative
assistance by appointed counsel." 190 Analytically, that same situation
exists here: the judge is not completely comfortable allowing the
defendant to wander alone into the minefield of a criminal trial but
wants to protect her constitutional right to proceed pro se.
McCracken suggests that forcing standby counsel to be at the defend-
ant's disposal is indeed a workable, viable option, given the weighty
interests at stake.
V. CONCLUSION
The final rationale for adopting the solution of standby counsel
as sufficient protection of the rights of a pro se defendant of questiona-
ble competency (or even sound competency), is that, in the words of
Judge Enright, dissenting in United States v. Aponte,' 9' this gives the
defendant the "best of both worlds."' 92 "The defendant had whatever
advantages [that] accru[ed] to his interest under Faretta together with
all the advantages appointed counsel could bring to his case."' 93
In conclusion, this Comment hopes to spur the courts to adopt a
solution that takes into account their own needs of efficiency and
accuracy, while at the same time recognizing the defendant's rights as
a member of this society and as a human being.
STACEY A. GIULIANTI
189. 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974).
190. Id. at 92.
191. 591 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1978).
192. Id. at 1251 (Enright, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
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